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THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURTS TO REGULATE THE
PRACTICE OF LAW: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
THOMAS M. ALPERT*
INTRODUCTION
The increased public scrutiny of the legal profession in recent
years has required state courts to decide whether they or the state
legislatures possess the constitutional power to control the practice
of law. With but few exceptions, the courts have determined that
the doctrine of separation of powers limits or even precludes legis-
lative regulation of this vital profession. Alexis de Tocqueville
would not have been surprised. As he wrote in Democracy in
America:
If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply without
hesitation that it ... occupies the judicial bench and the bar. The more we
reflect upon all that occurs in the United States, the more we shall be per-
suaded that the lawyers, as a body, form the most powerful, if not the only,
counterpoise to the democratic element.1
If the legal profession was to counterbalance the democratic ele-
ment effectively, it certainly could not be subject to popular con-
trol. Regulation of the lower part of the profession by the higher,
or the bar by the bench, would be essential. Tocqueville's contem-
poraries in the early nineteenth century would have been less pre-
scient, for in those years neither the courts nor the legislature had
as yet won the sole power to control the legal profession.
This Article examines how the courts came to assert success-
fully their claim to control the bar. It argues that they did not
mount an offensive to gain ultimate control until the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. The history of the regulation
of the profession prior to this time provided little justification and
* B.A. Yale, 1976; A.M. Harvard, 1977; J.D. Harvard, 1982; Member, Massachusetts
Bar. I would like to thank Mr. Daniel Coquillette, Lecturer on Law at the Harvard Law
School, and my former colleagues in the Harvard University History Department graduate
program, Messrs. Gregory Mark and William Treanor, for their generous advice and encour-
agement in the preparation of this Article. They are responsible for many of the good things
in this Article but for none of its faults.
1. 1 A. DE TOCQUEvLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMmuc^ 278 (Knopf ed. 1945).
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less incentive for such an offensive. However, by the end of the last
century the assertion of the claim had become necessary to protect
professional interests from possible legislative interference. This
Article contends that the courts justified their position by referring
to models of lawyers as officers of the court and as members of a
professional guild led by the courts and the bar associations. This
Article argues further that while the desire to protect the bar per-
sists, the justifications for doing so have lost much of their persua-
siveness. Finally, it suggests that with these arguments removed,
there is little reason to exempt lawyers from ultimate legislative
control.
I. A LAWYER'S ROLE: THE THREE MODELS
The lawyer can be seen in one of three ways: as a member of a
guild, as an attorney for a client, or as an officer of a court.2 Each
view constitutes a model for how the lawyer should behave and, by
implication, suggests the institution which should be responsible
for governing the legal profession. The nineteenth century case of
Splane's Petition4 illustrates these models.
Splane sought admission to practice law in the orphan's court
of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, basing his claim on a statute
2. I am grateful to Mr. Daniel Coquillette of the Harvard Law School for suggesting
these models.
3. These models are not mere abstractions but are derived from English history, and as
such arose in an order different from that suggested in the text. By the end of the twelfth
century, with the gradual replacement of trial by battle, first by a decentralized and then by
a centralized court system, litigants needed attorneys who could travel to London to stand
in for them and represent their interests. At first these attorneys were usually court employ-
ees who were experts in procedure. By the end of the thirteenth century, "common attor-
neys" who could devote their full time to private practice replaced the clerks, but the con-
cept of lawyers as officers of the court persisted. See H. KIRK, PORTRAIT OF A PROFESSION: A
HISTORY OF THE SOLIcrroR's PROFESSION, 1100 TO THE PRESENT DAY 76 (1976). The guild
model was the last to arise. By the end of the fourteenth century the inns of court (where
barristers resided), "encouraged by the judges, began to insist upon the gentility of their
members, and to aspire to the neo-classical ideal of a profession of gentlemen, detached
from the pursuit of lucre and united in their devotion to a superior vocation." Baker, Coun-
sellors and Barristers: An Historical Study, 27 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 205, 224 (1969). The guild
mentality came later still to the other branch of the English legal profession, the solicitors.
The early 1730s saw the formation of the Society of Gentlemen Practisers in the Courts of
Law and Equity, the importance of which was "that there was for the first time a body of
attorneys and solicitors formed for the purpose of improving the standards and representing
the interest of the profession." KIRK, supra at 23.
4. 123 Pa. 527, 16 A. 481 (1889).
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that governed the subject. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
which evidently found him a somewhat seedy character who should
not be set loose upon orphans, denied his petition. To justify its
decision, the court ruled that the statute upon which Splane had
relied was an unconstitutional encroachment upon its judicial pow-
ers. The court's explanation of this ruling illustrates all three mod-
els of the lawyer's role:
[1] The profession of law is one of the highest and noblest in the world. [2]
The relation between attorney and client is a close one, and involves matters
of great delicacy. [3] The attorney is an officer of the court, and is brought
into close and intimate relations with the court. [4] Whether he shall be ad-
mitted, or whether he shall be disbarred, is a judicial, and not a legislative,
question.5
The first sentence illustrates the guild model. In this model,
the lawyer's first duty is to the profession (or guild), "one of the
highest and noblest in the world.' 7 The second sentence suggests
the attorney model, which views the lawyer in relation to his client,
to whom he owes his primary duty." The third sentence clearly re-
flects the court model. The lawyer, as an officer of the court, owes a
duty first to the judicial system, and his in-court activity defines
this special character.9
Clearly, the Pennsylvania court erred in concluding that the
courts can best control the practice of law. In fact, only a court
model view of lawyers leads to that conclusion. Presumably, the
lawyer should be governed by those to whom he owes an agent's
duty. Each model suggests a different principal. The guild model
views the lawyer as owing a duty to other lawyers, who should have
power to govern the bar. The attorney model gives power to the
client. Since each client cannot exercise control over the profession
as a whole, the public, speaking through its representatives in the
5. Id. at 540, 16 A. at 483.
6. The guild model lawyer should seek to preserve the profession from disrepute by, for
instance, favoring minimum and maximum fee schedules and opposing advertising. Such
measures, while probably denying immense wealth to any single lawyer, would provide a
comfortable living for each member of the guild. They would also preserve the decorum of
the profession and ward off charges of money grubbing.
7. Splane's Petition, 123 Pa. at 540, 16 A. at 483.
8. The attorney model lawyer (or, more pejoratively, the "hired gun") would oppose,
among other things, any duty to disclose to a court wrongdoing by his client.
9. The court model lawyer would favor sanctions against lawyers who spoke to the press
or in some other way attempted to influence the judical process.
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legislature, must stand in the client's stead. The court model posits
a duty to judges, who as embodiments of the judicial system
should then control the bar.
Of these three options, complete self-regulation never has
been feasible in the democratic United States. However, the bar
associations at times have exercised a kind of quasi-jurisdiction 0
under the benign supervision of the courts. For example, the Mas-
sachusetts rules of court in 1810 gave county bar associations the
right to limit the number of persons who could practice in the
state's court of common pleas and supreme court. This power was
attained when "[o]rganization men within the [legal] profession for
the first time wholeheartedly accepted the primary role of the judi-
ciary in formulating regulations for legal education and admission
standards."11 These men did not seek powers akin to those of a
municipal corporation, but instead chose to place the bar under
the aegis of a friendly branch of the state government.12 In other
states, too, final control of the bar generally has resided with either
the legislature or the judiciary.13 A glance at the three models sug-
gests that the extent of judicial control somehow should be corre-
lated both with the public's need for a specially protected legal
guild and with the importance of the courts to the lawyer's profes-
sional life. If the public does not need to give the guild preferential
treatment, and if the lawyer's work revolves primarily around
noncourt matters, then the attorney model and the police power
should give control to the legislature. Yet the extent of judicial
control has been determined not just by models and arguments,
but also by events. To understand how events and models interact,
one must examine the history of the regulation of the legal
profession.
10. Bar association influence was limited in the first half of the nineteenth century but
grew significantly thereafter. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 276, 561-66
(1973).
11. G. GAWALT, TE PROMISE OF POWER: THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETrS,
1760-1840, at 107 (1979).
12. Since both the legislature and the governor in Massachusetts had taken recent anti-
lawyer actions, it was not surprising that the bar leaders chose to ally themselves with the
courts. See id. at 90, 93, 99.
13. In New Jersey, control over bar admissions remained formally with the executive
branch from the colonial era until 1947. In re Branch, 70 N.J.L. 537, 57 A. 431 (1904). A
constitutional revision in that year gave control over the bar to the judiciary. N.J. CONST.
art. VI, § 2, 1 3.
[Vol. 32528
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II. THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE TO 1776
The attorney, court, and guild models are not new. All three
were established throughout Europe by the end of the Middle
Ages, but their relative strengths varied in the different legal sys-
tems. On the Continent, young men decided early in their careers
whether to become judges or lawyers, while in England only law-
yers (indeed, only pleaders) became judges.14 In contrast, the Eng-
lish system fostered a unity of interest between the courts and the
legal profession and led to a unique judicial concern with and suc-
cess in controlling that profession.15
To understand this development, one must bear in mind that
the English legal profession is divided into two branches."" One
branch assists the litigant in pleading; the other substitutes for the
litigant. The first branch arose as a practical response of litigants
to "[tihe captiousness of the old procedure."1 7 Pleading was both
so technical and so important that most litigants needed assis-
tance. At first, the litigant's friends provided this aid, but the con-
tinuing demand for technical help produced professional pleaders
by the end of the thirteenth century. The second branch was cre-
ated by command rather than through custom. The notion that
one person could not merely assist but actually could substitute for
another did not come easily to traditional legal systems. The con-
cept arose in England not because most litigants needed stand-ins,
but because the monarch did. As Sir F.W. Maitland observed:
"The king ... appoints representatives to carry out his multitudi-
nous law-suits, and the privilege that he asserts on his own behalf
he can concede to others."1 " Thus, "[i]n England ... the right to
appoint an attorney [or substitute] is no outcome of ancient folk-
law; it is a royal privilege."1 9 The demands for this privilege proba-
bly outraced the king's ability to administer it. In any event, the
Statute of Merton in 1236 allowed freemen to use attorneys in cer-
14. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F.W. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I 205 (2d ed. 1898); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229,
318-29 (4th ed. 1936); T.F.T. PLucKNEr, A CONCISE HISTORY OP THE COMMON LAW 237 (5th
ed. 1956); J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 133-34 (2d ed. 1979).
15. See generally sources cited at note 14, supra.
16. See generally Baker, supra note 3.
17. 1 POLLOCK & MATLmAND, supra note 15, at 212.




tain cases without applying for specific royal writs. 20 The use of
attorneys continued to grow, and in 1292 King Edward I in effect
ceded control over both attorneys and pleaders to the justices of
his courts.21 As Maitland explained:
In that year King Edward directed his justices to provide for every county a
sufficient number of attorneys and apprentices [pleaders] from among the
best, the most lawful and the most teachable, so that the king and people
might be well served. The suggestion was made that a hundred and forty of
such men would be enough, but the justices might, if they pleased, appoint a
larger number.22
In practice, however, the English courts never were entrusted
with exclusive control over either branch of the profession. During
the next two centuries, the ancient category of pleaders generally
was limited to those who had attained at least the status of barris-
ter, so called because these lawyers had been admitted to the "bar"
of one of the four inns of court.23 The pleaders were effectively free
from legislative control: "After 1275 no statute or ordinance was
passed by the Parliament or made in council affecting the disci-
pline of the pleaders, for it was they who advised both on matters
affecting the law."'24 By the same token, the courts did not govern
the barristers. Rather, the inns which had admitted these pleaders
generally bore the responsibility for disciplining them.'The courts
could disbar barristers, and judges frequently controlled proceed-
ings at the inns. Nevertheless, according to Sir W.S. Holdsworth:
"The barrister. . . was in no sense an officer of the court and was
much less directly under its control."2 5
In contrast, Holdsworth has argued that attorneys2 were in-
deed officers of the court,27 and to an extent this was true. A stat-
20. See KIRK, supra note 3, at 2.
21. 1 ROT. PAr.. 84 (1292). It is likely, however, that the king did not abandon entirely
his power to appoint attorneys by writ. See KIK, supra note 3, at 7; 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 15, at 317.
22. 1 POLLOCK & MATAND, supra note 15, at 216. For the Latin text of the directive,
see KiRK, supra note 3, at 6.
23. See 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at ch. 8.
24. KiRK, supra note 3, at 10.
25. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 434. But see Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 472,
162 N.E. 487, 490 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) ("What the courts could not do by the instrument
of a writ, the judges did by orders in their capacity as visitors").
26. The attorney was one of the predecessors of the modem solicitor. By 1700, the
terms were essentially synonymous. See KIRK, supra note 3, at 14-16.
27. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 435.
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ute in 140328 gave the courts general supervisory powers over attor-
neys, and, after a period of instability, the judges began to exercise
effective control. Further statutes required them to examine pro-
spective attorneys and discipline those who had acted improp-
erly.29 Despite these powers, courts shared control over the practi-
tioners.30 In the first place, some attorneys-those representing the
king-were not subject to such judicial governance.3 ' More signifi-
cantly, even private attorneys were controlled by judges who them-
selves operated under and were subject to the limitations of statu-
tory law. Blackstone suggested the ambiguous nature of judicial
control when he wrote that "attorneys. . .are in all points officers
of the respective courts in which they are admitted; and . . . are
peculiarly subject to the censure and animadversion of the judges.
.. .And many subsequent statutes have laid them under farther
regulation. s3 2
Colonial American lawyers, like their English counterparts,
28. 4 Hen. 4, c. 18 (1403).
29. See KIRK, supra note 3, at 68-72; Note, Admission to the Bar and the Separation
of Powers, 7 UTAH L. REV. 82, 83 (1960).
30. Supporters of inherent judicial control have demurred to this suggestion that the
legislature as well as the courts had a hand in governing attorneys. They support their posi-
tion by asserting that, in these cases at least, Parliament did not act as a legislature: "The
power possessed by Parliament is more analogous to the fully executed power of a constitu-
tional convention ratified by the people." In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 385, 240 N.W. 441,
446 (1932). Thus, Parliament did not legislate, but rather granted power to a separate
branch of govenment. This contention is itself open to challenge. First, Parliament often
provided specific instructions in its statutes concerning the legal profession. For example, a
1605 statute prohibited attorneys from allowing others to use their names for the purpose of
acting as attorneys, and a 1633 statute required the judges on assize to compile a detailed
list of the attorneys in the counties they visited. See KIK, supra note 3, at 71. Detailed and
frequent regulations of this sort can be characterized more felicitously as legislation than as
constitutional mandates. Second, the very attempt to analogize parliaments in the years
before the American Revolution to constitutional conventions is wrongheaded. See infra
text accompanying note 39.
Some proponents of judicial control have appreciated this fact and have used it to sup-
port their position. For example, the court in In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899),
argued that the comparatively recent origin of separation of powers made any exercise of
legislative control in England irrelevant to the question at hand, namely, "what the nature
of the power [to control the bar] is, and whether it is one which naturally pertains to the
courts." Id. at 84, 54 N.E. at 648. Such an interpretation, if seen properly, should render the
actions of English courts as meaningless in this regard as those of Parliament. If this were
so, only the early American experience would be relevant. That experience does not show
that the power to control the bar pertained to the courts alone. See infra text accompanying
notes 33-37.
31. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 468.
32. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 26.
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were governed by a hodgepodge of authorities. In three colonies,
the courts produced rules to regulate legal practice.3 In three
other colonies, the courts governed the bar by virtue of legislative
grants of power.3 4 In two colonies, legislation gave the governor
power to license lawyers, but the assemblies legislated on such pos-
tadmission questions as how many attorneys one party to an action
could retain and what they could charge.3 5 In four colonies,30 the
legislatures took an active role in all phases of the regulation of the
legal profession. 7
The English and American experiences before the Revolution
provide little basis for the contention that control of the legal pro-
fession was or would have been regarded by the framers of the first
state constitutions as an inherently judicial task and thus pro-
tected from legislative encroachment. This may be attributable in
part to the lack of a clearly formulated doctrine of separation of
powers during this era. Such a doctrine was developed in the 1770s
and 1780s; its fundamental principles were that all power lies with
the people, that all branches of government hold power equally
and directly from the people, and that each branch therefore has
only those powers which the people in their constitutions have del-
egated to it.39
Where did the legal profession fit in this scheme? Did courts
control it as part of their inherent judicial powers,40 or did the leg-
33. Massachusetts, North Carolina and Georgia. See C. WARN, A HISTORY OF THE
AmERIcAN BAR 83-88, 123, 126 (1911).
34. Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Connecticut. See id. at 109, 121, 130.
35. New York and New Jersey. See id. at 95-96, 112.
36. Virginia, Maryland, New Hampshire and Rhode Island. See id. at 41-43, 53, 139,
141-42.
37. I was unable to discover how the legal profession in colonial Delaware was
regulated.
38. For contentions of this sort, see, e.g., Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar v. State
ex rel. Baxley, 295 Ala. 100, 324 So. 2d 256 (1975); In re Branch, 70 N.J.L. 537, 57 A. 431
(1904); In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899); Green, The Courts' Power Over Admission
and Disbarment, 4 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1925).
39. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERiCAN REPuBLIc 1776-1787, at 344-89 &
passim (1969).
40. Because many state constitutions lack an explicit separation of powers clause, some
commentators have felt impelled to distinguish between judicial power that arises from such
clauses and "inherent" judicial power which courts are said to possess by virtue of their
existence. See, e.g., Miller, The Illinois View of the Judical Power-A Reply, 19 A.B.A.J.
616, 617 (1933); Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of
Law-A Proposed Deliniation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 782, 784-87 (1976). The distinction seems
unnecessary;, one can almost certainly infer a separation of powers provision into any mod-
(Vol. 32
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islature do so under its police powers? The first century of Ameri-
can independence gave no greater support to the proponents of ju-
dicial control than had the pre-Revolutionary years.
IM. THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1876: THE ERA OF JOINT CONTROL
Some combination of legislative and judicial control has char-
acterized the practice of law in every state. Courts have justified
their acceptance of a measure of legislative control in one of three
ways:
(1) Legislative regulation is effective only insofar as the courts ac-
quiesce in it. They acquiesce
(a) to encourage inter-branch comity,
(b) to avoid inter-branch tension, or
(c) because the legislature is merely declaring judicial power.
(2) Legislative regulation is acceptable when it aids courts but is
unacceptable when it harms them.
(3) The legislature may control public welfare so long as it does not
interfere with judicial functions.41
These justifications do not give courts much assistance in de-
lineating legislative and judicial spheres, but during the country's
first century such assistance seemed unnecessary. The two
branches rarely fought over control of the legal profession.42 Courts
often were content to consider individual cases and let the legisla-
ture set general rules. 43 For example, the California Supreme Court
gave the legislature "plenary control over the qualifications, admis-
ern American state constitution. See, e.g., City of Carrington v. Foster County, 166 N.W.2d
377, 382 (N.D. 1969); Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 691 n.6, 426 A.2d 929,
934 n.6 (1981). The distinction would gain importance only in the unlikely event that a state
constitution explicitly gave control over the bar to the legislature and the state courts re-
fused to abide by this provision, claiming that such power was inherently judicial. Such a
decision might provide federal courts with a rare occasion to apply article IV, section 4 of
the Constitution, by which the United States guarantees to each state a "Republican Form
of Government."
41. See Note, supra note 40, at 798-99, which providbs an excellent analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of each view. For similar but less sophisticated categorizations, see
Green, supra note 38, at 2; Annot., 144 A.L.R 150 (1943).
42. See, e.g., WARREN, supra note 33, at 232-33 (examples of continued legislative regu-
lation of the practice of law in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century United
States).
43. See Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635, 637 (1935).
1983] 533
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sions, oath, or duties of attorneys at law," 4 yet it also upheld "the
inherent power" of a district court judge to disbar a lawyer who
failed to show him the proper respect.45 Florida drew the distinc-
tion between general and specific control along the lines of admis-
sion and disbarment. The legislature could set general require-
ments for admission, but only the courts could disbar a specified
lawyer.4" Despite these clear divisions, conflicts sometimes arose.
When this occured, courts were at least as likely to place ultimate
power in the legislature as in themselves.
Probably the leading case from this period regarding the con-
trol of legal practice was In re Cooper,47 decided in 1860. The New
York legislature had enacted a statute which provided automatic
admission to the bar for graduates of Columbia Law School.
Cooper applied for admission under this law, but a state supreme
court declared the statute unconstitutional and rejected him. The
court of appeals reversed, on a four-to-three vote. It found that
since the state constitution did not delegate power over the bar
explicitly to the judiciary, such power remained with the legisla-
ture. The court held that the legislature could grant power over
bar admissions to the courts, as it had previously done, but it was
not required to do so. The court was willing to accept the concept
of concurrent jurisdiction, but it saw ultimate power residing in
the legislature. 8
44. Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 245 (1864). See also Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293
(1863). Both of these cases affirmed the legislature's power to prescribe a test oath designed
to prevent Confederate sympathizers from serving as lawyers. Tennessee upheld the legisla-
ture's power in this area by prohibiting a test oath designed by a district court judge and
not approved by the legislature. Champion v. State, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 111 (1866).
45. People ex rel. Mulford v. Turner, 1 Cal. 143 (1850). Today, the California Supreme
Court claims for itself the inherent power to amend or annul statutory rules controlling the
bar. See Stratmore v. State Bar, 14 Cal. 3d 887, 538 P.2d 229, 123 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1975);
Brydonjack v. State, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018 (1929).
46. Wolfe v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278 (1868). This position has since been disapproved, and
control of the Florida bar has been given to the court, first by case law in Petition of Fla.
State Bar Assoc., 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1938), and then by constitutional provision, FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 15.
47. 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). An American Law Reports annotation argues that Cooper was
based primarily upon special provisions of the 1846 New York constitution. Annot., 144
A.L.R. 150, 172 (1943). See also Green, supra note 38, at 8-10. In fact, the court's opinion
was much more broadly based. Moreover, these provisions were not carried forth into subse-
quent constitutions, and despite this, Cooper is still good law in New York. See infra note
96.
48. Cooper, 22 N.Y. at 93.
534 [Vol. 32
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The Cooper position did not command universal assent, but
clear challenges are difficult to locate. One candidate might be Ex
parte Secombe.4 Secombe had been disbarred by the Minnesota
Territorial Court in 1856 for violating a territorial statute by his
misbehavior in court. He filed for mandamus in the United States
Supreme Court but the Court denied his petition. Speaking for the
Court, Chief Justice Taney explained that the judiciary possessed
a general supervisory power over the bar: "[I]t has been well-set-
tled, by the rules and practices of common law courts, that it rests
exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become
one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what
cause he is to be removed."50 Secombe asserted that the lower
court had based the disbarment not on its own powers but on a
statute and that he had violated none of the statute's terms. These
arguments failed to convince the Court, which held that the stat-
ute gave the lower court broad supervisory powers. The Court was
never called upon to decide whether the lower court could have
disbarred Secombe absent this statute. Thus, Taney's statement
about well-settled judicial power is not just misleading history; it is
also dictum.
The Court failed to clarify its position in Ex parte Garland,5 1
a post-Civil War test oath case. Garland had served in the Confed-
erate Congress but had received a presidential pardon after the
Civil War. Thereafter, Congress passed a law requiring federal
courts to refuse to license any former Confederate officials. 52 The
Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held this law unconstitu-
tional. Writing for the Court, Justice Field asserted principally
that the law was ex post facto and a bill of attainder53 but also
suggested that the bill interfered with judicial control over the
practice of law: "Attorneys and counsellors are not officers of the
United States.. . . They are officers of the court, admitted as such
by its order. ' 54 Still, Field did not seem to object as much to the
form of legislative control as to its substance. He acknowledged
49. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1857).
50. Id. at 13.
51. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
52. Id. at 334-35.
53. Article I, section 9, clause 3 of the Constitution reads: "No Bill of Attainder or ex
post facto Law shall be passed."
54. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1867).
1983] 535
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that the legislature can "prescribe qualifications for the office" of
attorney as for any other, but held that in so doing the legislature
could not inflict an unconstitutional punishment.5 5 Dissenting, Jus-
tice Miller argued that only the common law gave courts control
over legal practice; the legislature could reclaim that control at
will.
56
In many jurisdictions the issue of control over the legal profes-
sion remained peripheral. Some courts, such as those in Wisconsin,
avoided doctrinal determinations while in practice deferring to the
legislature. 57 Others, when faced with the question of deciding
where ultimate authority lay, continued to adhere to legislative
supremacy in theory as well.58 Already, however, a growing profes-
sional self-awareness and the changing composition of the bar in
the major northern industrial states was affecting both the amount
of attention paid to the question of who should control the bar and
the answer the question produced.
IV. 1876-1933: THE FORMULATION OF THE THEORY OF JUDICIAL
CONTROL
A. The Court Model
The final third of the nineteenth century and initial third of
the twentieth century saw a heightened commitment to profes-
sional identity and autonomy in the American bar. Using a strat-
egy employed by other professionals in this period,59 lawyers
sought to increase their status and decrease their competition. 0
These efforts began in the 1870s with the reorganization of law
school education, led by Harvard's Dean Christopher C. Langdell,6 1
and the creation of powerful bar associations, first on a local and
then on a national level.2 At the same time, bar leaders tried to
55. Id. at 379-80.
56. Id. at 385 (Miller, J. dissenting).
57. See, e.g., In re Goodell, 48 Wis. 693, 81 N.W. 551 (1879).
58. See In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906). The holding there,
that the legislature possesses the constitutional power to establish the qualifications for ad-
mission to the North Carolina bar, was reaffirmed recently. In re Smith, 301 N.C. 621, 272
S.E.2d 834 (1981); In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771 (1975).
59. See generally M. LARsoN, THE RiSE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977).
60. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AmERICAN LAW 550 (1973).
61. Langdell was appointed Dean of the Harvard Law School in 1870. See R. STEVENS,
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at 35-72 (1983).
62. The Bar Association of the City of New York was founded in 1870, the American
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limit the number and type of persons who were eligible to practice
law. Their campaign gained special urgency as the population from
which new lawyers could be drawn changed.
The influx of eastern and southern European immigrants into
the United States profoundly influenced the American bar. Some
of these immigrants became lawyers, often after attending night
school or receiving some other nonelite form of legal education.
Many members of the established bar attempted to limit the ac-
cess of these newcomers to the profession,s3 frequently imposing
higher educational standards for admittance.6 4 Legislatures, how-
ever, sometimes refused to impose these standards; judges, being
members of the bar, tended to be more receptive.65 This, at least,
was the experience of Illinois.
Prior to 1897, graduates of Illinois law schools received auto-
matic admission to the bar on a showing of good character. 6 That
year, the state supreme court promulgated rules requiring all can-
didates to take a bar examination and raising the mandated length
of law school study prior to the examination to three years from
two.6 7 Students already enrolled in two-year law schools petitioned
the court to exempt them from the operation of the new rules and
secured a "sense of the assembly" resolution to that effect from the
legislature.66 Despite these efforts, "the court, intimating that the
rule was framed in the interest of the people of Illinois, remained
obdurate.... '" In response, the legislature enacted a law which
exempted these students from the new admission requirements.
Shortly thereafter, in 1899, Henry Day"0 and other graduates of
two-year schools presented their diplomas and sought admission to
the bar under the terms of this law.
Bar Association in 1878. Id. at 92.
63. Criticism of immigrant lawyers had occurred before, but it had never been so wide-
spread. See LARSON, supra note 59, at 127 (describing attempts to control Irish-American
lawyers in New York in the 1840s).
64. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUsTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 40-129 (1976).
65. Id.
66. See Lee, The Constitutional Power of the Courts Over Admission to the Bar, 13
HARv. L. REv. 233, 234 (1899).
67. Id. at 233.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 234.
70. The real leader of the Illinois students was reported to be William Angel. N.Y.
Times, June 20, 1899, at 2, col. 4.
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The Illinois Supreme Court would not tolerate even this minor
interference with its plans to heighten bar admission standards. In
In re Day,71 it struck down the legislature's attempt to "encroach
upon a power belonging to the judicial department. '72 This rigidity
can be explained only by a fear, shared by many judges, that the
bar was being overrun by persons they considered to be untrained
and unqualified. 73 The court's attempt to distinguish Cooper pro-
vide a glimpse of this fear:
The legislature of New York . . . only sought to admit the graduates of a
great university [Columbia], who had been examined by eminent lawyers; but
under our [former] rule, persons were admitted who had been only nominally
in attendance for the stipulated period of time, upon schools of a very differ-
ent grade . .. In view of the disastrous consequences to the profession and
the public, the rule by which it was only a step from the diploma mill to the
bar was changed, and in an effort to discharge a duty to the public, the gen-
eral standard of admission was raised. 4
In short, the court could tolerate automatic bar admissions for stu-
dents at Columbia but not for the graduates, often immigrants, of
the "diploma mills."
When lawyers tried to heighten their prestige, they found it
useful to restrict access to the bar by immigrants and newcomers75
As one analyst has noted: "Heterogeneity. . . threatens the capac-
ity of lawyers to govern themselves, an essential element of their
claim to professional status.718 A decision such as Day reduced
that threat, and it also furthered the goal of self-governance in a
more general way. Bench and bar had long been closely linked be-
cause judges and lawyers were members of the same profession.7
Judges previously had claimed and been given a special role in the
control of that profession, but one generally subject to legislative
limitation. Now, they wanted to turn the tables. They demanded
that legislative power be restricted, if not altogether eliminated.
71. 181 IlM. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
72. Id. at 98, 54 N.E. at 653.
73. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 64; A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE
RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF THE BAR AND BENCH 1887-1895 (1960).
74. In re Day, 181 Ill. at 97-98, 54 N.E. at 653.
75. Women were among the newcomers prevented from practicing law. See Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
76. Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, 1981 Wisc. L. REV. 1117, 1177. See
also LARSON, supra note 59, at 40-47.
77. There were few lay judges in any but the lowest courts after 1800. See FRIEDMIAN,
supra note 60, at 109-11.
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They justified this demand by using the traditional characteriza-
tion of lawyers as officers of the court and then claiming that inter-
ference with these officers in turn interfered with the functioning
of the judicial branch. This, they claimed, violated the doctrine of
separation of powers. Thus, a guild model organization, in which
lawyers were accountable to that branch of government composed
almost entirely of lawyers, was legitimized by a court model
justification.
Ironically, judges asserted this justification at precisely the
time when the practice of law had begun to move out of the court-
room and into the law office. "The slow estrangement of the lawyer
from his old and natural haunt, the court, was an outstanding fact
of the practice in the second half of the [nineteenth] century. 78
One can only speculate as to whether judges simply ignored the
tension between the court model and the changing reality or un-
consciously revealed it in the stridency of their opinions.
The court model and the concomitant formulation of the sepa-
ration of powers principle were in evidence in 1912, when an Ohio
trial court decided In re Thatcher." The state supreme court had
disbarred Charles Thatcher for unethical practices, but the legisla-
ture subsequently passed a law that in effect nullified the disbar-
ment. The Lucas County Common Pleas Court, by a three-to-one
vote, found this law unconstitutional. The lead opinion of Judge
Manton reveals the influence that the court model had begun to
have on judges:
We may ask... what would be the effect if the courts are deprived of the
assistance of the bar, and all who have any acquaintance with the business of
the courts would answer that the courts could not carry out their functions.
Then would the courts be in any better condition if they were compelled to
accept as members of the bar, persons without legal learning, and wanting in
the proper conception of the ethics of the profession? But it will be answered
that we presume that the legislature would not destroy the courts. But if the
courts are menaced they are not a free agency, as the people intended they
should be; free, in carrying out their delegated functions, from the control of
the legislature. It can readily be seen how the general assembly, if it served
its purpose, might cripple the courts by compelling them to accept an ineffi-
78. Id. at 549. See also 1 L. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819-
1948, at 369-71 (1946).
79. In re Thatcher, 22 Ohio Dec. 116 (Lucas Co. Common Pleas Ct. 1912), aff'd sub




cient, incompetent, and immoral bar, and so destroy their usefulness as a co-
ordinate branch of the government.... 80
Here the court model justifies judicial control of the legal profes-
sion; the legislature cannot rule on disbarment, for allowing it to
do so could menace the courts.
The question arises as to how persuasive this line of reasoning
seems when it is applied to legal activities that are unrelated to the
courtroom. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, for one, was not dis-
posed to follow all the logical implications of Thatcher in a
noncourtroom setting. In In re Saddler,"" a 1913 case, the court
upheld a state statute which prohibited courts from disbarring a
lawyer for acts involving moral turpitude but unconnected with his
professional duties, until after he had been convicted. The court
accepted the view that judicial control over lawyers for actions
touching directly upon the courts or upon clients was "so necessary
to the full and complete administration of justice that such power
cannot be taken from the courts by legislative enactment. ' s2
"But," the court asked, "does such a necessity exist when applied
to the nonprofessional misconduct of an attorney, such as acts that
may show deficiency of character and a lack of proper regard for
his duties toward mankind generally, but that do not relate to his
professional or official duties as an attorney?"83 Noting that even
judges were answerable to the legislature, via impeachment, the
court could see no reason why lawyers should be immune from
some legislative supervision."4
The Saddler opinion did not go far toward allowing legislative
control. The judiciary still governed both the lawyer's court-related
and client-related activities. Nonetheless, Saddler did suggest that
the legislature could have the final say on at least some aspects of
legal ethics. In the post-Day world, this clearly had become a mi-
nority position. 5
80. In re Thatcher, 22 Ohio Dec. at 121.
81. 35 Okla. 510, 130 P. 906 (1913).
82. Id. at 519, 130 P. at 910.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See cases cited in Dowling, supra note 43.
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B. The Court and Guild Models Linked
Since Day, the argument that lawyers were officers of the
court had been used to justify judicial control of the bar. Tied to
this court model, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly,
was the guild model. The most eloquent plea to link them came
from Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo of the New York Court of Ap-
peals. In the 1928 case of Karlin v. Culkin,s he described the cor-
ruption judges sought to eradicate:
A petition by three leading bar associations ... gave notice to the court that
evil practices were rife among members of the bar. "Ambulance chasing" was
spreading to a demoralizing extent. As a consequence, the poor were op-
pressed and the ignorant overreached.. . . Wrongdoing by lawyers for claim-
ants was accompanied by other wrongdoing, almost as pernicious, by lawyers
for defendants.. . .The bar as a whole felt the sting of the discredit thus put
upon its membership by an unscrupulous minority.
8
'
The courts responded by launching an investigation.8 Karlin, a
personal injury lawyer, refused to testify, arguing that the court
lacked the power to examine him.89 The court of appeals unani-
mously rejected this contention."
Cardozo's opinion reveals both the persistence throughout this
period of a reformist tradition and the much stronger persistence
of the court model of the legal profession. Reformism by the late
1920s was not necessarily nativist; Cardozo himself was Jewish, al-
beit from the New York Sephardic "aristrocracy." Still, in distin-
guishing between the "unscrupulous minority" of "ambulance
chasers" and other lawyers, Cardozo revealed that he saw in the
bar a stratified profession which had originated before World War
I and which had solidified with the growth of corporate law firms
in the 1920s.9 1 Cardozo believed judges would tend to be respon-
sive to the higher ranks of that profession, especially to the bar
associations, which he referred to as "the organs of [the bar's] com-
mon will." 92 Other judges shared this view, and since the 1870s had
86. 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
87. Id. at 468, 162 N.E. at 488.
88. Id. at 468-69, 162 N.E. at 488-89.
89. Id. at 469, 162 N.E. at 489.
90. Id. at 479-80, 162 N.E. at 493.
91. See AUERBACH, supra note 64, at 40-73, 130-57.
92. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. at 468, 162 N.E. at 488. On the bar associations as repre-
senting only one part of the profession, see AUERBACH, supra note 64, at 102-29.
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been working with bar associations to govern the profession.93
Cardozo also believed that lawyers were closely bound to the
courts and subject to their direction:
The appellant was received into that ancient fellowship [of lawyers] for some-
thing more than private gain. He became an officer of the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the
court was due, whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld.Y
Lawyers and judges were members of the same guild, and this
guild existed for the aid and under the direction of the courts. Car-
dozo reaffirmed the significance of this link at the end of his opin-
ion: "If the house is to be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and
govern it, rather than for strangers, to do the noisome work."95
Cardozo thus tied together the guild and court models and pro-
vided a rationale for the link.
Unlike the court in Day, Cardozo did not attack concurrent
legislative jurisdiction of the practice of law, although he clearly
believed that legislatures should defer to courts as a matter of pol-
icy. He did not even need to overrule Cooper.s6 In this respect, he
was typical of many judges of the period who wished to assert judi-
cial power over lawyers and yet were unwilling or unable to deny
some slight measure of legislative control. These judges tried to de-
lineate a small sphere of legislative power. The old distinction be-
tween individual cases and general rules had broken down as other
courts joined New York in conducting inquiries into the operation
of the bar as a whole.9 7 One analyst suggested in 1929 that recent
cases were holding that "although the legislatures may require ap-
plicants to the bar to be good citizens, only the courts can set up
standards for attorneys in their professional capacities."' s As hard-
93. See Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 619, 620 (1978); Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer
Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEo. L.J. 705, 707-08 (1981).
94. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. at 470-71, 162 N.E. at 489.
95. Id. at 480, 162 N.E. at 493.
96. Id. at 477, 162 N.E. at 492. Cardozo asserted that Cooper would be at issue only if
the legislature sought to withdraw or modify judicial power. Cooper is still good law in New
York. See Cohn v. Borchard, 25 N.Y.2d 237, 250 N.E.2d 690, 303 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1969); In re
Bercu, 188 Misc. 406, 415, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730, 738 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rev'd on other grounds 273
A.D. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948), afl'd per curiam, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949). See
also N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 30.
97. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 637-38 and cases cited therein.
98. Comment, Legislative Encroachment on the Judiciary-Power Over Bar Admis-
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ship replaced prosperity that year, however, conflict destroyed
even these limited attempts at a legislative-judicial
accommodation.
V. THE NEW DEAL AND AFTER: THE COURT MODEL CHALLENGED
New Deal critics attacked the bench and bar as among the
elite American institutions allegedly serving the interests of a fa-
vored class rather than of society as a whole. It must therefore
have come as no surprise when Charles A. Beardsley, a former
president of the California State Bar, published in the October
1933 issue of the American Bar Association Journal the most di-
rect attack to that date on the right of courts to regulate the prac-
tice of law. 9
The Illinois Supreme Court had recently delegated some
quasi-governmental powers to the voluntary Illinois State Bar;
Beardsley claimed the court did not have the right to delegate a
power which it did not possess. Breaking with the guild and court
models, he denied that lawyers were officers of the court: "'Officer
of the court' is only a name, and ... the name is not used in the
constitutions." 100 By that time, after all, lawyers conducted most of
their business outside the courtroom. Even in court, they owed a
duty only to their clients. If lawyers owned a larger duty as a result
of their specialized training, they owed it to society as a whole, to
all three branches of government rather than to the courts alone. 11
By using the attorney model, Beardsley pointed out the falla-
cies in the argument for judicial control of the bar. His attacks on
the court model were particularly telling. The shift in the locus of
legal practice away from the courtroom, which had begun in the
late nineteenth century, continued unabated.102 The argument that
lawyers should be controlled by state assemblies as were other pro-
fessionals, one would think, should have proven quite cogent. It
must have seemed only a matter of time before members of Car-
dozo's "ancient fellowship" would join plumbers, barbers, and
beauticians as, in effect, another legislatively regulated
sions, 15 ST. Louis L. REv. 96, 98 (1929).
99. Beardsley, The Judicial Claim to Inherent Power Over the Bar, 19 A.B.A.J. 509
(1933).
100. Id. at 510.
101. Id.




Though Beardsley's attack was not to be ignored, the initial
response was relatively restrained. Amos C. Miller, the former
president of the Illinois Bar, replied in the subsequent issue of the
American Bar Association Journal.104 He attempted to justify the
actions taken by his organization and by the Illinois Supreme
Court and to refute Beardsley's arguments. He did not, however,
deny the legislature a role in the process of bar regulation, pro-
vided it acted in aid of the court. "No one," he said, "would ques-
tion the right of our legislature to declare that any person ignorant
of the law or of bad character should not hold himself out as an
attorney at law."1 05 While he seemed to favor, on principle, "the
complete organization of the bar under the command and direction
of the [state] Supreme Court," he knew that such action would
have to await "the prevailing sentiment." 106
While some commentators followed Miller's example of cau-
tion,1 0 7 other writers and judges soon came to believe that the time
for expanded judicial control of the profession was at hand. With
the failure of the Roosevelt Court plan, many judges and establish-
ment lawyers felt that the court had survived the worst of the New
Deal onslaughts.10 8 The prevailing sentiment now allowed them to
take the offensive. They used two means to assert control, bar inte-
gration and a broader definition of the judicially controllable prac-
tice of law.
Bar integration required lawyers to join a state bar association
under the ultimate control of the state supreme court. It was not a
new concept. Herbert Harley, a midwestern lawyer and newspaper
editor who founded the movement, called as early as 1914 for com-
pulsory membership in bar associations.10 9 Supporters urged its
103. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 641.
104. See Miller, supra note 40.
105. Id. at 618 (emphasis original).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Sheedy, Smith & Matuschka, Legislative Power Over Officers of the
Court, 6 J.B.A. KANs. 311 (1938)(a majority of states rightly favors concurrent jurisdiction
over lawyers); Comment, Power of the Courts and Legislature to Regulate the Practice of
Law and Procedure, 36 Mic. L. REv. 82, 87-88 (1937) ("The inherent powers which are a
part of the court's constitutional jurisdiction are only those necessary for its proper
function").
108. See AUERBACH, supra note 64, at 191-97.
109. Id. at 120.
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adoption to strengthen the power of the profession.110 Northern
devotees also suggested that it could be used to control the foreign-
born and otherwise undesirable elements of the bar, 11 while some
Southern whites saw in it an instrument to dominate black law-
yers.112 During the first twenty-five years of the movement, some
legislatures integrated state bars by statute.1 These laws often
gave supervision over the bar to the courts. The courts in turn reg-
ularly sustained these laws and often declared that they, rather
than the legislatures, were actually integrating the bars. 4
Ironically, the same court which twenty-six years earlier had
opened the door to some legislative control of the bar via its deci-
sion in In re Saddler,1 5 now slammed it shut. The Oklahoma state
legislature in 1929 had passed a law integrating the state bar, but
repealed it ten years later."1 The supreme court immediately rein-
tegrated the bar by judicial order.1 17 It based its decision on its
"inherent power and authority to provide rules creating, control-
ling, regulating, and integrating the State Bar of Oklahoma."11' 8
Following this action, other courts began to assert and exercise
ultimate control over bar organization.11 9 In 1943, for example, the
Wisconsin Supremb Court took cognizance of a statute enacting
bar integration but chose to postpone its consideration of whether
to effect it until the many lawyers in military service had returned
home. 120 Its opinion was moderate in tone, but it firmly asserted
that both policy and constitutional considerations gave courts ulti-
mate control over the profession.2
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See D.D. McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 44-45 (1963). Southern bars were inte-
grated in both senses of the word. Three Southern states (North Carolina, Virginia and
West Virginia) maintained racially integrated official state bars and segregated voluntary
bar associations. Id. at 50.
113. Id. at 41-49.
114. See id. at 42-51. See also Dowling, supra note 43, at 638.
115. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
116. State Bar Act of 1929, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 1-18 (repealed 1939).
117. In re Integration of State Bar of Okla., 185 Okla. 505, 508-11, 95 P.2d 113, 116-20
(1939).
118. Id. at 507-08, 95 P.2d at 116.
119. See McKEAN, supra note 112, at 47-49.
120. In re Integration of the Bar, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943).
121. The court finally ordered temporary bar integration in 1956, In re Integration of
the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N.W.2d 602 (1956), and made it permanent two years later, In re
Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 93 N.W.2d 601 (1958).
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Courts also manifested their growing unwillingness to share
power with the legislature in cases involving legal practice outside
the profession. Judges, as has been shown, had asserted their claim
to control the bar by virtue of their close and ongoing relationship
with it. 122 Yet, as legal work flowed out of the courtroom and into
the office, that claim weakened. Courts had to consider not merely
who could practice law, but also what consituted legal practice. Bar
association members, for whom the issue barely had existed before
the Depression, grew sufficiently alarmed over this "problem" by
1930 to form the first ABA Committee on the Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law.123 This committee and others like it kept the issue
before the courts, hoping that the judiciary would protect their
members from what they thought to be unlawful competition.1 24
Judges generally were receptive to pleas for protection, defin-
ing legal practice broadly to include a number of activities that
affected courts only indirectly. By 1938, for example, case law pro-
vided that the preparation of legal instruments such as real estate
documents constituted the practice of law.1 25 It did not necessarily
follow, however, that only courts could govern these activities. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, gave such power to the
legislature: "The Legislature may establish such qualifications as it
chooses for those who are permitted to act as conveyancers, exam-
iners of title, organizers of corporations, or any other type of legal
services which does not give them power to influence the course of
justice as administered by the courts. 1 26
Most courts, however, were not so restrained. With a broad
definition of legal practice came a willingness to increase judicial
power in order to control it. Illinois again led the way, anticipating
the course of decisions in other states. Expanding upon its decision
in In re Day,27 the state supreme court held in the 1932 case of
122. See supra notes 59-98 and accompanying text.
123. See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. R.v. 1, 6-10 (1981).
124. The elimination of the unauthorized practice of law was a major activity of the
National Bar Program of the American Bar Association. During this period, the Associa-
tion's Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law created a monthly journal devoted
exclusively to this goal. See 1 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEws 1 (1934).
125. Hill, Real Estate Brokers and the Courts, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 72 (1938).
126. In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 395, 240 N.W. 441, 449 (1932). Subsequently, this
language was held to be dicta and was disapproved. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis.
2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
127. 181 IMI. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
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Illinois State Bar Association v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank,128 that it had the inherent power to punish for contempt any
unauthorized practitioner, whether lawyer or lay person. The court
reasoned that since a court could control authorized practice, it
surely could control unauthorized practice. 12 9 The court accepted
the contention that "[p]erhaps the major portion of the actual
practice of law under modern conditions consists of the work of
attorneys outside of any court and has nothing to do with court
proceedings."130 From this, though, it reached the surprising con-
clusion that such work nevertheless fell exclusively within its
domain:
It is just as essential to the administration of justice and the proper protec-
tion of society that unlicensed individuals should not be permitted to prey
upon the public in that sphere of the practice of law as it is with respect to
proceedings in the courts. It is no less a usurpation of the function and privi-
lege of an attorney and an affront to the court having sole power to license
attorneys, for one not licensed as such to perform the services of an attorney
outside of court proceedings.181
Thus, not only could judges control all the activities of lawyers, no
matter how tangentially connected to the court, they could even
control the noncourt activities of nonlawyers, so long as these
judges considered such activities to constitute the practice of law.
The potential for expansion of power that the court model gave to
judges had been demonstrated. 3 2
The "imperial judiciary" grew as judges continued to expand
their conception of the practice of law well beyond the limits of the
courtroom. Some state courts struck down statutes that allowed
nonlawyers to represent clients in adjudicatory hearings before ad-
minstrative agencies. s They justified these decisions as necessary
to protect the public.134 Once judges moved so far beyond a tradi-
tional court model in order to justify their authority, however, they
128. 344 IM. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931).
129. Id. at 472-73, 176 N.E. at 906.
130. Id. at 473, 176 N.E. at 906.
131. Id.
132. For an explanation of the influence of the People's Stock Yards Bank case, see
Sanders, Procedures for the Punishment or Suppression of Unauthorized Practice of Law,
5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 143-47 (1938).
133. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bar Ass'n v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420
(1959); State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941).
134. See, e.g., Earley, 144 W. Va. at 527, 109 S.E.2d at 435.
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left themselves open to a new round of attacks. This second wave
of assaults upon judicial power began in the early 1960s and has
not yet abated.
VI. 1960-1983: THE GUILD MODEL CHALLENGED
Since the 1960s, lawyers have been subjected to heavy public
criticism. A number of factors have contributed to this disenchant-
ment. The civil rights movement and its successors increased pub-
lic sensitivity to the inequities in the access to legal care.135 Water-
gate led to a widespread suspicion that the term "legal ethics" was
an oxymoron.136 Most important, consumerism has produced con-
cern that lawyers are failing to provide adequate and reasonably
priced legal services.13 7 Advocates of legal consumerism regard the
interests of the client, who is the consumer of legal services, as par-
amount to those of the professional. 38 Accordingly, consumerism
represents the attorney model and is in conflict with the guild
model. The guild model has been used to justify judicial control of
the bar; consumerism has attacked that control. Adopting Car-
dozo's formulation, one can say that critics did not trust lawyers to
clean their own house; they preferred that the work be left to
strangers.
These critics began by fighting the bar's claim to monopoly
status. At first, they could only complain; for example, a 1960 law
review comment denied that courts had the power to prevent
nonlawyers from representing clients in hearings before adminstra-
tive agencies.139 Soon, though, they gained a powerful ally. The
United States Supreme Court in a series of decisions beginning in
1963 held that state courts and bar groups could neither prohibit
group legal services14 or lawyer advertising,' 4' nor promulgate
135. See AUERBACH, supra note 64, at 263.
136. See, e.g., Hertzberg, Watergate: Has the Image of the Bar Been Diminished?, 79
CoM. L.J. 73 (1974). But see Auerbach, The Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE L.
Rzv. 1287, 1288 (1976)(legal profession has transformed "Watergate ... from a badge of
professional shame to a source of professional pride").
137. See Wolfram, supra note 93, at 621-23; Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession's
Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective,
1983 Wisc. L. REv. 639.
138. See Garth, supra note 137, at 641-42, 668-71 & passim.
139. Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judi-
cial Power, 28 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 162 (1960).
140. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
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minimum-fee schedules.142
State legislatures, but not state courts, have followed the Su-
preme Court's lead.143 In so doing, the legislatures have placed
themselves in potential or actual conflict with their respective state
courts. For instance, the Texas legislature recently included the
state's integrated bar under the provisions of a "sunset law" which
requires state agencies periodically to justify their continued re-
ceipt of legislative funding.14 4 The Washington state legislature
went further in 1979 by enacting a statute allowing escrow agents
and other lay persons to prepare loan documents and similar pa-
pers for purchasers and sellers of real estate,14 5 presumably be-
cause clients could thereby be spared the additional expense of hir-
ing a lawyer to perform these services. This statute in effect
46
challenged both a 1978 Washington Supreme Court ruling that lay
performance of these services constituted the illegal practice of
ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar As'n,
389 U.S. 217 (1967); United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
141. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
142. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
143. This Article will not discuss the recent efforts of the Federal Trade Commission to
investigate whether the current regulatory scheme hinders the provision of adequate legal
services. Not surprisingly, the probe was resisted by most state bar associations. Its history
and the efforts exerted to quash the investigation can be traced in a series of articles in the
A.B.A. Journal. FTC to Hear Appeal on AMA Ad Restraints, 65 A.B.A.J. 171 (1979); FTC
Probe of Legal Profession Draws Fire, 65 A.B.A.J. 330 (1979); FTC "Profession-Probes"
Under Fire in Senate, 65 A.B.A.J. 1618 (1979); Slonim, Bar Survey Should Be Volun-
tary-Peterson, 66 A.B.A.J. 31 (1980); Slonim, FTC Future Discussed as Lawyer Probe Re-
news, 66 A.B.A.J. 1056 (1980); Middleton, FTC Survey to Probe Lawyers Ad Practices, 67
A.B.A.J. 1435 (1981); Middleton, FTC Jurisdiction Issue Goes to Congress, 68 A.B.A.J. 528
(1982).
The supremacy clause of the federal Constitution, U.S. CONsT. art. 6, makes a separation
of powers argument by state courts unavailing against any branch of the federal govern-
ment. See Wolfram, supra note 93, at 643. Thus, the FTC's assertion of authority does not
bear upon the conflict between the courts and the legislatures. It is, however, symptomatic
of the erosion of support for the claim that state courts adequately regulate the legal
profession.
144. See Jeffers, Government of the Legal Profession: An Inherent Judicial Power Ap-
proach, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 385, 392-94 (1978).
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.62:10 (West Supp. 1983).
146. The legislature attempted to write the statute so that it could be said to conform
to the court's previous decisions. The attempt was a weak one, however, see Comment,
Great Western and Its Legislative Aftermath: Unconstitutional Usurpation of Court's
Power?, 16 WmLAlmsa L. REv. 917 (1980), and was not even discussed by the court in its
subsequent review of the statute. See Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Kuhl v. Kassler Es-
crow, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 443, 635 P.2d 730 (1981).
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law,1 7 and an earlier assertion that the court had "sole jurisdic-
tion" over the practice of law in Washington. 48 Not surprisingly,
the court later found that in passing the 1979 statute "the legisla-
ture impermissibly usurped the court's power. "149
Legislatures and regulatory agencies have been willing to chal-
lenge courts directly by attempting to subject lawyers to their own
jurisdiction. 150 After the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that only
graduates of three-year law schools could take the bar examina-
tion, the state legislature imitated the Illinois legislature of the
Day era: it exempted students then enrolled in other types of law
schools (principally two-year schools).' 5' Despite a prior declara-
tion that it alone had the power to control the practice of law,152
the Georgia Supreme Court did not have occasion to overrule the
legislature on this matter. Others, however, have answered these
challenges. Writers, the bar, and the courts have reasserted the
view that the judiciary maintains an inherent power to control the
practice of law. Lawyers'53 and law students'" have written arti-
cles to that effect. Bar associations have secured, in some states,
the passage of constitutional amendments expressly granting
courts this power. 15
147. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great Western Union Say. and Loan Ass'n, 91
Wash. 2d 48, 586 P.2d 870 (1978).
148. State ex rel. Schwab v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 80 Wash. 2d 266, 269, 493
P.2d 1237, 1239 (1972) (emphasis original).
149. Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Kuhl, 96 Wash. 2d at 453, 635 P.2d at 736.
150. Commentators, too, have attacked the power of courts to regulate the legal profes-
sion. See Note, supra note 29; Wolfram, supra note 93.
151. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-103(b)(iii) (Supp. 1982). See Gunter, Regulation of the Legal
Profession-Judicial or Legislative?, 10 GA. ST. BAR J. 589 (1974).
152. Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914
(1970).
153. See, e.g., Jeffers, supra note 144.
154. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 146.
155. The following states have constitutional provisions explicitly granting their courts
power over the practice of law- Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. XXVIII), Florida (FLA. CONST.
art. V, § 15), Kentucky (Ky. CONST. § 116), New Jersey (N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, 1 3), and
Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c)). Not all of these provisions are of recent vintage.
Some state constitutions give state supreme courts "jurisdiction" over bar cases, and courts
have interpreted these clauses to give them ultimate power to control the bar itself: Indiana
(IND. CONST. art. VII, § 4, see Professional Adjusters, Inc., v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779 (Ind.
1982)); Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(B), see Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329
So. 2d 437 (La. 1976)); Ohio (Omo CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g), see Smith v. Kates, 46 Ohio
St. 2d 263, 348 N.E.2d 320 (1976)); and South Carolina (S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4, see Kirven
v. Board of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, 271 S.C. 194, 246 S.E.2d 857 (1978)).
The South Dakota constitution is ambiguous. See infra note 176.
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In Kentucky and Washington, state auditors have attempted
to examine the books of their integrated bars, just as they would
do for other state agencies, but neither Kentucky 1 5  nor Washing-
ton157 judges have allowed the state-agency audits of their bars to
take place. These judges have. continued to use the rhetoric of the
guild and court models to justify their control. The Maryland
Court of Appeals recently remarked that "the legal profession, for
time out of mind, has been infused with and, in a sense, been a
trustee for, the public interest."1 58 It then used the People's Stock
Yards Bank logic159 to conclude that the court should supervise
the trustee:
In light of the intimate relationship between the learning and character of
attorneys, the perceptions of the public, and the performance by the courts of
their constitutionally assigned functions, we are confident that, as a general
matter, the proper repository for the authority, responsibility, and obligation
to regulate the profession, in our scheme of constitutionally divided realms of
power, is and must ultimately be the judiciary of this State.1e
Using similar rhetoric, other courts have also reasserted their own
power.16 1
VII. TOWARD LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
A. Toward Shared Powers
Despite the counterattack by much of the bench and bar, the
earlier criticisms of the court model and the more recent attacks
on the guild model have had some effect in producing a more mod-
erate claim for judicial control. A recent law review note urges a
"practical accommodation of separated powers." '  To comport
156. Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980) (holding that the
audit would contravene Kentucky's constitutional provision giving the courts full power
over the practice of law).
157. Graham v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 624, 548 P.2d 310 (1976).
158. Attorney General of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 696, 426 A.2d 929, 937 (1981).
159. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
160. Waldron, 289 Md. at 697-98, 426 A.2d at 937.
161. See, e.g., Board of Conm'r of Ala. State Bar v. State ex rel. Baxley, 295 Ala. 100,
324 So. 2d 256 (1975); Stratmore v. State Bar, 14 Cal. 3d 887, 538 P.2d 229, 123 Cal. Rptr.
101 (1975); Lublin v. Brown, 168 Conn. 212, 362 A.2d 769 (1975); Professional Adjusters,
Inc. v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. 1982); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d
437 (La. 1976); Smith v. Kates, 46 Ohio St. 2d 263, 348 N.E.2d 320 (1976); In re Petition of
Tenn. Bar Ass'n, 532 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. 1975).
162. Note, supra note 40, at 795.
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with the needs of today, it suggests a functional approach: legisla-
tive control should be presumed constitutional unless it "unreason-
ably hamper[s] the judiciary in the adjudicatory process. ' '163 This
standard, liberally applied, would entitle a legislature to regulate
most noncourt legal practice just as it regulates the practice of any
other profession. The courts, however, would have the final say.
Some courts have moved in this direction. In Sadler v. Oregon
State Bar,164 the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a statute against
its own rules when it granted the plaintiff access to disciplinary
records held by the state bar. The court explained that it would
sustain statutory regulation of the bar if the law did not "unduly
burden or substantially interfere with the judiciary." 65 Since this
statute did not touch the core functions of admission to the bar,
suspension, or disbarment, it was acceptable. 166
Balancing tests of this sort, however welcome in the shortrun,
do not solve the problem of judicial control over the bar. In the
first place, these "functional" analyses limit judicial power only
slightly, because courts themselves can determine when they are
"unreasonably hampered." If the Sadler decision, with its broad
definition of core functions, is any guide, courts will probably be
unwilling to concede much power to the legislature. Moreover,
even when they effectively limit judicial power, the balancing tests
are unsatisfactory. Those judges who are sympathetic to the legis-
lature have no rational grounds on which to base their decisions.
Rather, they must state that they were not unreasonably ham-
pered, or that legislative action did not interfere with core judicial
functions, or give some equally malleable ratio decidendi. In each
of these cases, the judge could just as easily have reached a con-
trary conclusion and explained it with the same language. Deci-
sions of this type merely encourage the belief that all case law is
arbitrary.
163. Id. at 802. See also Shapiro, Judicial Control Over the Bar Versus Legislative
Regulation of Governmental Ethics: The Pennsylvania Approach and a Proposed Alterna-
tive, 20 DuQ. L. REv. 13 (1982).
164. 275 Or. 279, 550 P.2d 1218 (1976).
165. Id. at 285, 550 P.2d at 1222.
166. Id. at 293-95, 550 P.2d at 1226-27.
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B. Toward Legislative Control
Over the years the scope of the police power has become "very
broad and comprehensive and flexible enough for the state to meet
the problems of changing social, economic and political condi-
tions.' ' 16 7 It has been defined as "simply the power to subject indi-
viduals to reasonable regulation for the purpose of achieving gov-
ernmental objectives such as the public safety, health, morals and
public welfare."16 8 To secure these ends, "[t]he state has power to
regulate a business, profession or occupation under its police
power." 6 9 Under this authority, states have regulated such profes-
sions as medicine,17 e dentistry,17 1 and engineering. 17 2 As a general
proposition, the various state legislatures are primarily vested with
this police power,17 3 and while subject to the limitations of reason-
ableness and nondiscrimination, "it is for the legislature to deter-
mine what measures are appropriate and necessary to conserve and
safeguard the public safety, health and welfare."17 4
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers,1 5 the
police power gives the legislature control over the practice of law,
absent convincing arguments to the contrary. Such arguments were
of questionable authority in the past and have no more force to-
day. The "inherent power" to control the bar is not a long-pre-
served judicial heritage; it is a product of the late nineteenth cen-
tury. As to the models on which it is based, the guild model has
come increasingly to seem as self-serving, while the court model
fails to define the core of present-day legal practice. They no
longer justify a special exemption for lawyers from legislative con-
trol. Courts should recognize this and modify their constitutional
interpretations accordingly. If they fail to act, the public should
167. People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 468, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (1967).
168. Doyle v. Board of Barber Examiners, 219 Cal. App. 2d 504, 509, 33 Cal. Rptr. 349,
353 (1963).
169. Pierstorff v. Board of Embalmers and Funeral Dirs., 68 Ohio App. 453, 41 N.E.2d
889, 890, app. dismissed, 138 Ohio St. 626, 37 N.E.2d 545 (1941).
170. E.g., Locke v. Ionia Cir. Judge, 184 Mich. 535, 151 N.W. 623 (1915).
171. E.g., Oshins v. York, 150 Fla. 690, 8 So. 2d 670 (1942).
172. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Woodruff v. Humphrey, 288 Pa. 280, 136 A. 213
(1927).
173. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 177 (1956).
174. Vermont Woolen Corp. v. Wackerman, 122 Vt. 219, 224-25, 167 A.2d 533, 537
(1961).
175. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Gilmore, 109 Me. 169, 180, 83 A. 673, 678 (1912)(under Ameri-
can constitutions, legislature has residual powers to act, except where otherwise restricted).
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amend state constitutions to give power over the legal profession to
their elected representatives.70
This transfer would not threaten legitimate interests of either
the public or the courts. As to the former, popular control would
not endanger civil liberties; the current system of bar regulation
has not produced an admirable record of protecting civil liber-
ties, and the legislatures probably could not do much worse. If
legislative encroachment occurred, it could be checked not by a
special disciplinary system for lawyers, but by something applica-
ble to all-the first amendment. Since the 1950s, the United States
Supreme Court has acted to protect lawyers who choose to re-
present unpopular causes17 8 or who are otherwise associated with
such causes, 79 basing its holdings on the freedoms of association
and expression. Any legislative attempts to threaten those free-
doms likely would be met with similar decisions. As to the state
courts, legislative exercise of the police power would not deprive
them of their ability to control lawyers who appear before them,
for they could still use the contempt sanction to protect the integ-
rity of the judicial branch. Contempt might give the courts a
smaller tool with which to work, but it is one more precisely suited
to the task than the doctrine of inherent power has ever been.
Are the beneficial possibilities of legislative control as limited
as the dangers? They might be. Legislatures have frequently acqui-
esced in judicial claims that the courts can best perform the day-
to-day functions of bar governance, and even with greater power,
the assemblies might continue to delegate these functions to the
176. See ARIz. CONST. art. XXVI; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12. A 1962 Arizona constitu-
tional amendment, ARiz. CONST. art. XXVI, § 1, limits judicial control over the practice of
law in Arizona by declaring that real estate brokers are allowed to practice law, in effect
overruling State Bar of Ariz. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1
(1961), supplemented on reh'g 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962). See Marks, The Lawyers
and the Realtors: Arizona's Experience, 49 A.B.A.J. 139 (1963). A 1972 South Dakota
amendment gives the state supreme court the power to make rules to "govern ... admis-
sion to the bar, and discipline of members of the bar," but adds that "[t]hese rules may be
changed by the legislature." S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12. The South Dakota courts have not yet
interpreted this amendment. See Comment, An Inevitable Clash of Powers? Determining
the Proper Role of the Legislature in the Administration of Justice, 22 S.D. L. REv. 387
(1977). See also Wolfram, supra note 93 (state constitutional amendment process offers the
best possibility of reducing judicial control of the practice of law).
177. See Martyn, supra note 93, at 720-22.
178. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
179. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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courts. Nonetheless, once ultimate legislative control is recognized,
the meaning of that delegation would change. The courts would
then exercise control as a matter of legislative grace, not of consti-
tutional right. The legislature could regain that power at any time
by passing a law, and the courts, aware of this possibility, would
constrain their activities accordingly.
Preferably, though, the legislatures would take a more active
role in bar governance for two reasons. First, they would probably
be less sympathetic toward the bar than are the courts. Legislators
are more susceptible to the influence of consumers of legal services
and they have no tradition of providing institutional protection for
the bar. Also, while the proportion of lawyer-legislators might be
high, it necessarily does not equal the proportion of lawyer-
judges.18 0 Nonlawyers in the legislatures seem to have different at-
titudes and ideas than do their lawyer counterparts,181 and these
differences should manifest themselves in debates over bar regula-
tion. Despite these factors, legislatures might nevertheless follow
the courts' lead and treat the bar with favor. They certainly are
subject to the persuasive power of well organized interest groups, 82
such as the bar, and the lawyers among them might be especially
inclined to protect the legal community. Still, over the last two de-
cades, legislatures have shown themselves increasingly willing to
challenge the bar.' While it is beyond the scope of this Article to
suggest other specific actions that they could take, it is reasonable
both to hope and expect that once legislatures gain control of the
regulation of legal practice, they will continue to build on their re-
cent efforts.
Second, legislative control would help to demystify the prac-
tice of law. Every other profession is governed by the edicts of the
legislature. If one wins a legislative battle, the success is clearly
political, and the public can use political means to ratify or over-
turn the legislative decision. But a victory in court is not seen as a
political victory; it is seen as a victory of right over wrong. Yet the
180. For example, only forty percent of the members of the 1981-1982 Texas legislature
were lawyers. Clark, Texas Legislators' Attitudes Toward the Legal Profession, 45 TMx.
BAR J. 571 (1982).
181. See, e.g., id.
182. See, e.g., R. HARs, A SACRED TRUST (1966) (study of American Medical Associa-
tion's efforts to block public health legislation).
183. See supra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
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decisions to adjust bar admission requirements, to integrate the
bar, or not to place lawyers under administrative regulations are
not questions of right and wrong; they are political and should be
viewed as such.
CONCLUSION
In England and America before the Revolution, no single au-
thority had control over the legal profession. In the century that
followed, even with the advent of the doctrine of separation of
powers, American courts and legislatures continued to share con-
trol, although ultimate power was probably thought to lie with the
legislature. Toward the end of the nineteenth century courts began
to assert their power to govern the practice of law, largely in order
to protect the bar from external challenges. To do so, they ap-
pealed to two models of legal practice-the court and guild models.
The New Deal era saw a challenge to the court model and an at-
tempt to replace it with one that held attorneys responsible to
their clients and to the public at large. After a period of hesitation,
the courts nonetheless were able to overcome this effort and enun-
ciate an even more comprehensive claim for judicial control over
the profession than before. The 1960s and 1970s produced a chal-
lenge to the guild model. The attorney model that was advanced in
the 1930s again was brought forth, this time to promote the inter-
ests of consumers of legal services. The outcome of these efforts
remains uncertain, but their success clearly would prove beneficial
to legal consumers.
While courts have continued to resist attacks on their power
to control the legal profession, neither the court nor the guild
model retains enough persuasive power to justify that control to
the lay public. Lawyers cannot justify a claim for a special exemp-
tion from legislative jurisdiction; they should no longer be an
American aristocracy.
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